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Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius
Maximus and Cicero de Ofciis*
R E B E C CA L ANG L AND S
ABSTRACT
When reading exempla and applying them to ethical decisions, Romans had to bear in
mind the principle of situational variability: whether an action can be judged to be right
depends on the circumstances in which it is performed; what is right for one person in a
given situation may not be right for another. This principle and its ramications are
articulated by Valerius Maximus, Facta et Dicta Memorabilia. Comparison with Cicero,
de Ofciis suggests that situation ethics was a key feature of Roman ethics and that,
within this framework, exempla may be understood as moral tools mediating between
universal and particular.
This article examines a key concept in Roman practical ethics — the principle of
‘situational variability’ or ‘situation ethics’1 — as it is set out in Valerius Maximus’
compendium of traditional exempla, Dicta et Facta Memorabilia (written c. A.D. 30). It
argues that Valerius’ treatment of the concept as it applies specically to the process of
reading and making use of exempla shows striking parallels with the treatment of the
topic found in works of Roman practical philosophy, and especially in Cicero, de
Ofciis, as it applies to moral evaluation and moral decision-making more generally.
The implications of this are various. First, it enhances our appreciation of Valerius
Maximus by demonstrating that his work contains nuanced exposition of ethical ideas.
In addition, my analysis shows that Valerius explicitly articulates meta-exemplary
precepts — i.e. guidance on how exempla should be read and used — and in this
respect is a useful source for our understanding of the Roman exemplary process more
generally. Next, my analysis can be used to make the case that situation ethics was an
important feature of the Roman ethical system, that awareness of its implications was
not limited to Stoic philosophy, and that it had a particular relevance for the rôle of
* The ideas in this article have been a long time germinating, and over the years I have presented the material that
forms the basis of this article to audiences in St Andrews, Exeter and King’s College, London; I am grateful to the
responses and discussion that ensued on these occasions. I am also very grateful to the anonymous readers of this
Journal, whose comments, I feel, have enabled me to improve radically upon the draft I initially submitted.
However, my warmest gratitude is for Chris Gill, who rst suggested that my discussion of Valerius Maximus
would benet from a comparison with Cicero, de Ofciis and then helped me, through discussion and through
comments on successive drafts, to see what the signicance of the parallels between the two might be.
1 The term ‘situational variability’ is used by Brad Inwood in his discussion of Stoic philosophy and the writings
of Seneca (B. Inwood, ‘Rules and reasoning in Stoic ethics’, in B. Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at
Rome (2005), 95–131, discussed further below). The concept of ‘situation ethics’ was developed in a Christian
context by Joseph Fletcher in Situation Ethics: The New Morality (1966); on this as applied to Roman ethics
see T. Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (2007), 179–90, discussed below.
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exempla within Roman ethics. My comparison of Valerius Maximus and Cicero also
establishes parallels between the process of reading exempla and the process of moral
reasoning within Roman ethics. My further hypothesis — described briey below — is
that these parallels will enable us to develop new approaches to the study of Roman
exempla and ethics, and this is the basis of a future research project. In this article,
however, I limit myself to establishing that Valerius Maximus outlines situation ethics as
a fundamental aspect of the Roman exemplary process, and that a comparison of his
ideas with those set out in Cicero, de Ofciis shows that there are clear parallels in
Roman ethics between the process of moral reasoning and the process of reading
exempla for moral purposes.
The idea that it is important to take full account of context when evaluating a moral
deed or making a moral decision, and that moral rules are therefore exible and subject
to exception and modication rather than being universally applicable injunctions, has
been developed most substantially in modern philosophy as ‘situation ethics’ and ‘moral
contextualism’. Two recent works of scholarship have independently suggested that this
was also an important feature of two rather different aspects of ancient Roman ethics:
popular morality and Stoic philosophy. Teresa Morgan has concluded, from her
extensive survey of popular wisdom literature from the early Roman Empire (where she
analyses proverbs, fables and gnomai, as well as exempla), that ‘situation ethics’ and
‘phase rules’ were key features underpinning Roman popular ethics. She has suggested
that these were particularly important in a culture such as that of early imperial Rome
which extended across a vast and diverse empire, which operated a highly structured
social hierarchy, and which used tools such as exempla, fables and proverbs to transmit
and share moral ideas.2 While Morgan deduces situation ethics to be an underlying
principle of popular ethics, Brad Inwood has shown that a very similar concept — what
Inwood describes as ‘exibility and situational variability’3 — is theorized by Seneca in
discussion of the rôle of rules and laws in Stoic moral reasoning. As Inwood suggests,
this concept has been developed within Stoic thought, and is articulated by Seneca as a
means of addressing a long-standing problem within Stoic as well as Aristotelian ethics:
how to apply universal moral injunctions in a way that takes account of particular
circumstances.4 Inwood draws upon the work of Frederick Schauer in order to produce
a rened model of how such situational variability might allow moral rules to be
applied in a way that is sensitive to circumstance: as guidelines that are generally to be
used as aids to moral reasoning, but which can, when occasion requires it, be dispensed
with.5 These ‘enable the moral reasoner to nd the balance between abstract theory and
the demands of a particular context’.6
Situation ethics, then, was both an underlying principle of popular morality in ancient
Rome and an idea that was theorized by ancient philosophers. One signicant contribution
2 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), especially 179–90.
3 cf. the phrase ‘situational sensitivity and variability’ (Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 104).
4 cf. A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vols 1 and 2 (1987), 429 on the issue of the practical
application of moral rules as a long-standing problem for Stoics. For a discussion of special circumstances within
the context of Stoic ethics and the idea of the ‘proper functions’ see Long and Sedley, op. cit., vol. 1, 359–68, with
the ancient sources cited there, especially Diogenes Laertius 7.108–9 (E): ‘Proper functions which do depend on
circumstances are mutilating oneself and disposing of one’s property’; Philo, On the Cherubim 14–15 (H);
Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1–12 (Q). In Stoic thought, some actions are ‘justied by a rational assessment of
the circumstances’ even though they ‘conict with what would be proper in most cases’ (ibid., 366). Cf.
Diogenes Laertius 7.130: ‘they say that the wise man will commit a well-reasoned suicide both on behalf of his
country and on behalf of his friends, and if he falls victim to unduly severe pain or mutilation or incurable
illness’ (ibid., 425).
5 Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 109–10; cf. F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991).
6 Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 131.
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made by my analysis of situation ethics in Valerius Maximus is that it bridges the gap
between the popular ethical practices inferred by Morgan and Seneca’s philosophical
discussion as elucidated by Inwood, enabling us to make a strong claim about the
presence of situation ethics as an ethical model across Roman culture, shared by popular
and philosophical ethical systems, and between practical and theoretical ethics.7 Valerius
Maximus’ Facta et Dicta Memorabilia is a work aimed at the literate upper classes of
Roman society, which endorses élite values; nevertheless, it is not a work which was
intended exclusively for a philosophical readership or as a contribution to philosophical
debates.8 My analysis therefore provides evidence that there was awareness outside
philosophical discourse of situation ethics as an ethical model and of its implications
and limitations. Furthermore, the author of the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia represents it
as particularly pertinent to the reading and interpretation of exempla, and the
application of exempla to one’s moral development. Morgan’s deductions about the
principles underlying Roman popular ethics are therefore conrmed by my
demonstration that they are systematically articulated in a non-philosophical work of
practical ethics, in relation to exempla.
Once we have established that situation ethics was a framework shared across Roman
culture in the rst century A.D. both for moral decision-making and for the use of
exempla in moral education, we can apply the same modern discussions of situation
ethics and contextualism to ancient exemplarity as are currently applied to ancient
moral reasoning, enabling us to appreciate in more nuanced fashion how exempla
worked within Roman ethics. Here I take as a model Brad Inwood’s application of the
work of Frederick Schauer to the study of Stoic moral reasoning.9 Exempla, in their
ethical (as opposed to rhetorical) guise, have usually been associated (at least implicitly)
with a deductive model of ethical reasoning and with deontology, and they have been
subject to similar criticisms as these ethical models.10 That is to say, they have been
viewed as constituting an ethical medium that is prescriptive, dogmatic, and inexible.
They are also seen, as a result of these features, to be subject to failure, not least when
the heroic deeds of outstanding individuals are inimitable by ordinary people, or when
the deeds of long ago no longer seem relevant or practicable in the present climate.11
My suggestion, which I will develop elsewhere, is that we see exempla as analogous to
moral rules in Stoic reasoning, as discussed by Brad Inwood: we should understand
them as subject to heuristic reading that applies the concept of situational variability.
This provides a framework that promises to go some way towards explaining the ethical
mechanisms by which Roman exempla retained their open-ended exibility and
7 On the relationship between popular morality and philosophical theory in ancient Rome see further Morgan,
op. cit. (n. 1), Appendix 3, 333–40, where she concludes that by and large these operate as discrete ethical
systems. However, she also suggests that Stoic or Stoicizing writings such as those of Cicero and Seneca often
bore a close relation to Roman upper-class mores (Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 335–6): Stoic ideas ‘not only
coincided conveniently with many of the traditional views of the Roman elite, but were adapting to them as
they became more popular’. Moreover, in Morgan’s analysis, exempla as an ethical medium are more closely
associated with élite values than other forms (Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 128–9).
8 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 125–30 and 159; see also R. Langlands, ‘Reading for the moral in Valerius Maximus:
the case of severitas’, Cambridge Classical Journal 54 (2008), 160–87 for the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia as a
work of practical ethics.
9 Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), passim. Teresa Morgan’s brief discussion of the work of Sayla Benhabib and Philippa
Foot points the way towards further exciting avenues of study (Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 185–8).
10 On the latter see Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 107–9.
11 cf. Montaigne, Essais III, 13, 1070: ‘tout exemple cloche’ (‘every example is lame’). Further on the inadequacy
of exempla in relation to a ‘crisis of exemplarity’ in the Renaissance, see the special edition of the Journal of the
History of Ideas 59 (1998), especially F. Rigolot, ‘The Renaissance crisis of exemplarity’, 557–563. On modern
criticisms of exempla as rigid and dogmatic see J. Allan Mitchell, Ethics and Exemplary Narratives in Chaucer and
Gower (2004), Introduction, and Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8), 161–4 with further bibliography.
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enduring moral relevance12 at the same time as appearing to act as clear moral injunctions
about how to behave.13
The article is divided into four sections. Section I provides an introduction to the concept
of situation ethics, through analysis of an anecdote told by Valerius Maximus about Cato
the Younger. Section II summarizes Cicero’s ideas about situation ethics as outlined in de
Ofciis, including the exposition of the four-personae theory, where Cicero also makes use
of Cato the Younger as an illustrative exemplum. This section also indicates how Cicero’s
precepts relate to his employment of exempla in that work. The next two sections provide
analyses of two chapters in Valerius Maximus in which he explores the idea of situation
ethics in relation to ducia or ‘condence’ (Section III) and necessitas or ‘necessity’
(Section IV). In this article I draw particular attention to the parallels between the ideas
set out by Valerius Maximus and those set out in Cicero, de Ofciis. It is generally
thought that de Ofciis — a work of pragmatic ethics designed to guide the élite Roman
through his everyday life — was inuential on the ethical thought of succeeding
generations,14 and it seems likely that Valerius was aware of Cicero’s work and that it
informed his own discussion, providing him with a conceptual language for exploring
these issues as they applied to the process of reading and learning from traditional
exempla. I conclude with some preliminary thoughts about how the framework of
situation ethics, as set out by Valerius Maximus and Cicero, might enhance our
understanding of how Roman readers read exempla for moral guidance in their own lives.
I CATO AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONA
In order to clarify what is meant by ‘situational variability’ and ‘situation ethics’, I start
with discussion of an anecdote told by Valerius Maximus in chapter 6.2 of his
Memorable Words and Deeds — a chapter devoted to the subject of freedom of speech
and action. As Valerius says, by way of introduction to the story, we would hardly
expect a chapter about libertas to omit mention of Cato — ‘What then? Freedom
without Cato? No more than Cato without freedom!’ (‘quid ergo? libertas sine Catone?
non magis quam Cato sine libertate!’, 6.2.5). However, the story that follows is not
necessarily the one we might expect, since his most famous act of freedom was the
suicide that liberated him from tyranny (which Cicero chooses to illustrate his
four-personae theory, discussed in Section II below). That story of Cato’s ‘illustrious end’
has already been told by Valerius at 3.2.14 (in a chapter on fortitudo), and alluded to
admiringly at 4.6.5. Here, however, Valerius relates a story dating from earlier in his
life, in 52 B.C., when Cato stood up to Pompey in court when the latter attempted to use
his inuence to get a guilty man acquitted:
For when he was sitting as judge in the case where the defendant was a guilty and infamous
senator, and tablets had been brought forward which contained Pompey’s praise of the
man, which without a doubt would have been effective on behalf of the guilty party, he
12 On this fundamental exibility of exempla see J. Chaplin, Livy’s Exemplary History (2000), M. B. Roller,
‘Exemplarity in Roman culture: the cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia’, Classical Philology 99 (2004), 1–56,
and ‘The exemplary past in Roman historiography and culture’, in A. Feldherr (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Roman Historiography (2009), 214–30.
13 See R. G. Mayer, ‘Roman historical exempla in Seneca’, in O. Reverdin and B. Grange, Sénèque et le prose
latine (1991), 140–69, especially 165 for the way that Seneca himself attempts to theorize the function of
exempla in Roman ethics.
14 On this see A. R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero’s de Ofciis (1996), 40–1 and P. G. Walsh, Cicero, On
Obligations (de ofciis) (2001), xxxiv.
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removed them from the court, citing the law [Pompey’s own] by which it was decreed that
those of senatorial rank should not be permitted to avail themselves of such support.
nam cum in senatorem nocentem et infamem reum iudex sedisset, tabellaeque Cn. Pompeii
laudationem eius continentes prolatae essent, procul dubio efcaces futurae pro noxio,
summovit eas e quaestione legem recitando, qua cautum erat ne senatoribus tali auxilio uti
liceret. (6.2.5)15
As so often in Valerius’ abbreviated exempla, the full force of the story is only evident if
you have just a little more information than Valerius gives in his text— hence my insertion in
square brackets: the law to which Cato appeals here had been passed by Pompey himself.16
His challenge to Pompey’s power has been mounted using Pompey’s own law against him, in
an act of witty deance that should make a reader gasp in astonishment at his cheek.
However, Valerius concludes the story by commenting that because this audacious deed
was performed by Cato in particular, our response to it must be different from what it
would have been had the deed been performed by someone else; we must interpret and
evaluate the story differently and see the act as a manifestation of a different moral
quality: ‘The individual (persona) concerned removes any amazement from this act, for
what would have seemed in another man audacity, in Cato is recognized as condence’,
(‘huic facto persona admirationem adimit: nam quae in alio audacia videretur, in Catone
ducia cognoscitur’, 6.2.5). In someone else this act would have been a manifestation of
the quality of audacia, which is not a commendable quality, but in this particular case it
can be recognized as ducia. So, in this case, an act performed by Cato is judged to be
praiseworthy at least partly on the grounds that it was Cato who did it.
The story illustrates clearly the importance of taking into account persona — the
particular nature and characteristics of the individual performing it — when it comes to
evaluating the moral signicance of an action. This is also one of the key precepts set
out in Cicero, de Ofciis. There, however, the emphasis is on the moment at which a
moral agent makes a moral choice, whether about a particular action or about the
general direction of his life, and on the need to take into account what one knows about
one’s own persona when deciding which course of action is the most appropriate.17
Here, in the context of Valerius’ collection of exempla, the issue of situational variability
is approached from the perspective of the reader of exempla, who is scrutinizing and
evaluating the actions of other people in order to learn from them how to live.18
If we read this anecdote looking for moral guidance for our own lives, the problem is
this: if a necessary condition for an act being good is that it was done by Cato (or
someone like Cato), how can it work as a moral exemplum? How could a morally
aspiring Roman reader apply this exemplum to his or her own life? The context — his
own persona — that lends Cato’s act moral value is so specic that it can hardly offer
straightforward guidance to readers about how to act in similar situations; it cannot be
prescriptive about what behaviour is required and cannot invite straightforward
imitation. This little passage neatly poses the perennial question of how readers of
exemplary tales can go about applying morals derived from the extraordinary and
particular deeds of heroes to their own ordinary lives, which is a central issue within the
Roman moral system.19 Furthermore, as both Cicero and Valerius Maximus make plain,
15 All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
16 Other versions of the story, where the defendant is named as Munatius Plancus, and emphasis is placed on the
hypocrisy of Pompey’s behaviour, can be found at Plut., Cat. Min. 48 and Pomp. 55.
17 See especially de Off. 1.93–153, discussed in more detail in Section II below.
18 For this ‘reading for the moral’ as an expectation of the reader of Valerius’ work, see Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8)
with Mitchell, op. cit. (n. 11).
19 For a discussion of this issue see Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8), especially 173–8, with further bibliography.
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the circumstances that might affect the moral value of an act are manifold, and include, as
well as the persona of the agent, the nature of the location in which it takes place and the
particular historical setting or moment in time.
In her brief discussion of situation ethics in Roman popular morality, Teresa Morgan
has pointed out that such sensitivity to context, whilst allowing the same moral values
to be shared by people from very different walks of life, also posed its own problems for
the moral agent engaged in decision-making: ‘If popular ethics were like a giant jigsaw
puzzle, how did each moral agent decide where he or she tted in? How did the moral
system, which we have been viewing as a whole, enable individuals to decide what was
good or bad, necessary or useful for them to do? It is a vital question, because if what is
good or bad for one depends on one’s situation, then to miscalculate that situation is to
court disaster.’20
An examination of the way Valerius Maximus articulates similar ideas about situational
variability to those found in de Ofciis equips us with the tools to begin to answer this
question. The four-personae framework outlined by Cicero, and the further precepts he
sets out about other contingent factors that need to be taken into account when one is
making moral choices, are applied by Valerius Maximus to the reading of exempla for
moral ends. The Roman ethical system places a particular burden on readers of exempla
as moral agents: in reading an exemplum, they need to understand the particular
circumstances that made it the right act for that exemplary gure at that moment, and
also to recognize to what extent it is appropriate for them to identify with that
exemplary gure. Indeed, in any given situation, they need to recognize who they are,
what the signicant aspects of their own particular context are, and what action is
therefore appropriate for them at that moment. An extremely important ethical skill,
then, is that of being able to evaluate ethical context and understand how individual
agents t into this context. If ethical value is to a certain extent contingent on
differences between individuals, it is very important that an individual understands how
to situate himself within the ethical system. Before you act up with Pompey, you have to
be sure that you really are Cato, otherwise you will end up looking like an idiot.
In this article I shall argue that Valerius Maximus is keen to impress this lesson upon the
readers of his exempla, and that he does so in a sustained and nuanced fashion in two
places in particular, which I shall analyse at length: chapter 3.7, whose subject is
condence in oneself ( ducia sui) and chapter 7.6 on necessitas. The anecdote about
Cato’s ducia discussed above provides a good example of the way that Valerius is able
to point out a knotty and important ethical issue in a straightforward fashion by citing
a brief version of a well-worn exemplary tale. Valerius’ project is part of a long
tradition of addressing ethical issues through consideration of exempla, for example in
the casuistic treatments of issues in practical ethics on which Cicero drew for de Ofciis,
such as those of Hecato, Panaetius and Posidonius, as well as in de Ofciis itself, which
has been described as displaying ‘a sensitive regard for the way exemplary cases express
the substance of moral dilemmas’.21
II SITUATION ETHICS IN CICERO, DE OFFICIIS
The most striking example of this is the extended treatment of the exemplum of Atilius
Regulus towards the end of de Ofciis Book 3 (3.99–115), which provides an attractive
20 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 185.
21 Mitchell, op. cit. (n. 11), 28; on de Ofciis as a work which uses exempla as a springboard for ethical
deliberation see further W. Olmstead, ‘Exemplifying deliberation: Cicero’s de Ofciis and Machievelli’s Prince’,
in W. Jost and W. Olmsted (eds), A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism (2004), 173–89.
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demonstration of how a traditional tale of heroism can be taken as a starting point for
complex ethical debate. Regulus can be seen as the archetypal hero of Cicero’s work in
that his decision to give himself up to torture and execution by the Carthaginians rather
than allow himself to be exchanged for Carthaginian hostages is illustrative not merely
of a variety of desirable qualities such as courage and patriotism, but also of the
archetypal quality that de Ofciis aims to inculcate in its reader in Book III, the ability
to take the right moral decision (rather than the apparently expedient one) in a given
situation.22
Regulus’ example is cited as illustration of the ability to discern when a course of action
that on the face of it appears to be benecial— in this case, staying in Rome with his family
and maintaining his status in Roman society — is actually not so: ‘When he arrived in
Rome, he saw the appearance of benet, but, as events relate, he judged it false’ (‘is cum
Romam venisset, utilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam iudicavit’,
3.99). Once he has established Regulus as this model of ethical judgement, Cicero then
goes on to demonstrate that the Regulus story itself is capable of different
interpretations, and that there is a range of alternative ethical perspectives on Regulus’
decision to leave his family and return to the Carthaginians. In sections 100–110 Cicero
responds in detail to a series of objections to Regulus’ decision posed by imaginary
interlocutors, which are clearly reprising well-known arguments about the case, perhaps
from declamatory exercises. Although he argues against them, the positions set out by
these interlocutors are perfectly sensible and philosophically informed, and indicate ways
that the exemplum might be used to think about issues such as the honourable versus
the expedient, or the status of oaths sworn to the enemy.23 This lengthy section
demonstrates that a single bold exemplum is able to allow for considerable moral
complexity. The meaning even of one of the most illustrious of Roman exempla is not
necessarily straightforward; a heroic act is susceptible to different interpretations by
different people. Above all, both the exemplum itself and Cicero’s extended discussion
of it illustrate the point that both interpreting exempla (as Cicero is interpreting
Regulus’ deed) and making ethical decisions (as Regulus has done in the story) are
processes that require a great deal of care and ne judgement.
As far as situation ethics goes, Cicero is concerned throughout de Ofciis to highlight
that there are many factors that need to be borne in mind when deciding which action is
appropriate in any given situation. These include external circumstances such as place
and time, as well as a set of personal circumstances set out in his theory of the four
personae (1.93–153). I shall turn to personal circumstances in a moment, but begin by
outlining what Cicero says about external circumstances, both before and after his
discussion of personae. In a discussion of justice he asserts that changing circumstances
often transform the moral signicance of an act: ‘occasions (tempora) often arise when
those things that seem to be most worthy of a just person, whom we would call a
“good man”, are utterly transformed and become the opposite’ (‘incidunt saepe tempora
cum ea quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine eoque quem virum bonum
22 cf. C. Gill, ‘The ancient self: issues and approaches’, in P. Remes and J. Sihvola (eds), Ancient Philosophy of the
Self (2008), 35–56, at 41, n. 24: ‘Regulus is offered as an illustration of Cicero’s overall project in Off. 3, that of
helping ordinary well-motivated people (i.e., in principle, anyone) to discriminate between what is just and what is
expedient (3.7–16, 99, 110, 115).’
23 3.100–10: e.g. ‘“O stultum hominem”, dixerit quispiam, “et repugnantem utilitati suae!”’ (3.100); ‘At stulte,
qui non modo non censuerit captivos remitttendos, verum etiam dissuaserit’ (3.101); ‘“quid est igitur”, dixerit
quis, “in iure iurando?”’ (3.102); ‘addunt etiam … addunt etiam … haec fere contra Regulus’ (3.103). Cf. C.
Gill, ‘Personhood and personality: the four-personae theory in Cicero de Ofciis I’, in Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy VI (1988), 169–99, at 198: Cicero ‘engages in debate on behalf of [Regulus’] response,
with imagined spokesmen for the more conventional and common-sense view that Regulus was acting with
unnecessary moral rigour and against his own best interests’. The text of de Ofciis used throughout is that of
M. Winterbottom (ed.), De Ofciis (2nd edn, 1996).
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dicimus commutantur untque contraria’, 1.31); his examples are keeping a promise or
repaying a loan, which may turn out to be the wrong thing to do in certain
circumstances. ‘Actions change with the circumstances, and the duty changes and is not
always the same’ (‘ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur ofcium et non semper
est idem’, 1.31).
Later Cicero explains that particular contexts, locations and moments in time call for
different forms of behaviour, and the difference between what is required can be so
great that it is possible that behaviour that is appropriate in one setting might even be
considered offensive in another. As one of the illustrations of his point that ‘there is so
much signicance in both place and time’ (‘tanta vis est et loci et temporis’, 1.144),
Cicero cites an exemplum from Athenian history in which Pericles rebukes Sophocles for
making an appreciative remark about a good-looking boy who walked past them while
they were having a formal meeting as generals, telling him that as a general he ought to
keep his eyes off the boys as well as his hands. Cicero comments: ‘if he had made the
same remark in the gymnasium, he wouldn’t have attracted the criticism that was
deserved here.’24 Ogling young men is par for the course in the setting of the
gymnasium, but unacceptable in a more formal setting; location is a determining factor.
In Book 3 Cicero makes a similar point, but with more moral force: ‘thus, many acts
that seem to be morally good by their nature, become not morally good because of the
occasions on which they are performed’ (‘sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse,
temporibus unt non honesta’, 3.95–6).
Meanwhile in 1.93–153 Cicero outlines and discusses the aspects of an individual’s
character and situation that need to be analysed, grasped and taken into account in
moral decision-making; these he divides into four personae or rôles.25 The rst consists
in the essential rôle common to everyone of being a human being (1.107), the second
the specic nature and qualities with which an individual has been endowed (1.107), the
third the various social attributes with which chance (casus) or circumstance (tempus)
has endowed the individual, such as wealth and rank (1.115), and the fourth the rôle
that he has chosen to take up in his life, such as the career of philosopher, lawyer or
orator (1.115). All of these, taken together, form an interlocking framework within
which an individual must make his moral choices. The rst two personae are given by
nature, and constitute the qualities that make a person human and then the qualities
that make a person a distinct individual. The third persona is made up of the
circumstances that chance has allocated to the person, such as wealth and birth. The
fourth persona is the outcome of a choice that an individual must make about the path
to follow in their own life, ‘the most difcult decision of all’ (‘quae deliberatio est
omnium difcillima’, 1.117), the rôle they have chosen to play. This, as Cicero makes
clear, will work best if it is made taking into account the natural strengths and
24 ‘Atqui hoc idem Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione caruisset’ (1.144). Valerius
Maximus tells this same story at 4.3.ext.1 and this has been identied as a passage where Valerius is drawing
directly on Cicero, de Ofciis. However, it is worth noting that there the story is used to make a different
moral point, about Pericles’ admirable sexual continence. My sense is that where Valerius is using exemplary
material from de Ofciis, he makes a point of giving it a different moral emphasis to indicate both his own
independence and the exibility of the material itself; for another example of this see also n. 55 below. For a
list of passages where scholars have thought Valerius Maximus is drawing directly on Cicero, de Ofciis see P.
Fedeli (ed.), M. Tulli Ciceronis de Ofciis Libri Tres (1965), xx. For some explicit comparisons between the
two works see W. M. Bloomer, Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility (1992), 89 (de Off.
3.45 and Val. Max. 6.5.4), 128–31 (de Off. 1.40 and 3.86 and Val. Max. 6.5.1), 106 (de Off. 2.71 and Val.
Max. 7.2.ext.9). See also Dyck, op. cit. (n. 14), 40–1 and Walsh, op. cit. (n. 14), xxxiv which describe
Valerius Maximus as using Cicero’s anecdotes rather than his ideas.
25 On this four-personae theory, see Gill, op. cit. (n. 23) with Gill, op. cit. (n. 22), 36–45 and C. Gill, ‘Particulars,
selves and individuals in Stoic philosophy’, in R. Sharples (ed.), Particulars in Greek Philosophy. Philosophia
Antiqua 120 (2010), 127–45, especially 137–43.
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weaknesses of the individual’s second persona (as well as, naturally, the constraints
imposed under the third persona).26 In Cicero’s account, there naturally occur many
different kinds of individuals, and there is a great variation in ways of being good
(‘innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen
vituperandorum’, 1.109); he illustrates this claim by citing twenty-four well-known
exemplary gures from Greek and Roman history who display sets of opposing
characteristics which are nevertheless all laudable.27 It is vital that in choosing one’s
life-path, as well as in decisions about individual actions, one is fully aware of one’s
own nature and takes this into account; this will make it easier to maintain the rôle one
has chosen and ensure the moral consistency (constantia) that will make it easier to
behave appropriately in any given situation: ‘each person should hold onto his own
characteristics, insofar as they are not awed, but nevertheless belong to him, so that the
decorum that we seek should be more easily retained’ (‘admodum autem tenenda sunt
sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus,
retineatur’, 1.110). There is no point ghting your own nature by choosing a path to
which you are ill suited and which you struggle to maintain; as far as possible the
personae must be in harmony with one another.28 In addition, different behaviour is
appropriate for those at different stages of life (1.122) and for people of different
backgrounds and status.
The range of different personal factors that need to be taken into account when making
moral decisions, and the range of ways that these factors might interact to produce the
specic context for any given moral decision, allow for a considerable range of
possibilities of morally right behaviour. In any given circumstance for a particular
individual, there should only be one act or decision that is ‘just right’29 for them, there
and then. However, there may be a range of ‘just right’ possibilities that they must
choose from according to their own particular contingencies. This allows for a
considerable exibility in Cicero’s ethical model, which enables individuals to make
choices about what behaviour is most appropriate for them, yet still stay true to the core
Roman virtues. This moral exibility is such that it is perfectly possible that in a given
situation the act that is right for one person might be entirely wrong for another person,
and entirely opposite responses are required by different people.30 Here Cicero takes as
his illustrative exemplum the suicide of Cato at Utica after his defeat by Julius Caesar,
arguing that such action might have been seen as a vice (vitium) in other people who
had found themselves in the same circumstances (eadem causa), whereas Cato, given the
person he was, had to die: ‘moriendum … fuit’ (1.112).
There has been considerable debate among scholars about the signicance of this
passage, and especially about what it can tell us about the concept of the ‘individual’ in
Roman ethical thought and about Roman attitudes towards suicide.31 I follow
26 As indeed will any decision about what action is absolutely appropriate: ‘Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus
quid deceat, complecti animo et cogitatione debemus’ (1.117).
27 cf. Gill, op. cit. (n. 23), 190: Cicero ‘reects a larger divergence in thinking about roles and role-playing’.
28 1.110: ‘neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi quod adsequi non queas’; 1.119: ‘nam cum
in omnibus quae aguntur ex eo quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid deceat exquirimus, tum in
tota vita constituenda multo est eius rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet
ipsis nec in ullo ofcio claudicare.’
29 For this phrase, see Gill, op. cit. (n. 25), 137, citing M. Schoeld, ‘The fourth virtue’, in W. Nicgorski (ed.),
Cicero’s Practical Philosophy (forthcoming); the English phrase ‘just right’ is useful because it incorporates the
sense of appropriateness in addition to a sense of moral righteousness that is present in the ancient concept of
decorum.
30 ‘Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim ut nonnumquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius
debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat’ (de Off. 1.112).
31 For the continuing debate about the signicance of this passage in understanding Roman attitudes towards the
individual and the self, see Gill, op. cit. (n. 23); R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality,
Life and Death (2006); Gill, op. cit. (n. 22); R. Sorabji, ‘Graeco-Roman varieties of the self’, in Remes and Sihvola,
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Christopher Gill in reading this passage not as a comment on the uniqueness of Cato as a
personality, but rather as a particularly striking illustration of the effective functioning of
the four personae acting in concert in the person of Cato. Nature has endowed Cato with
extraordinary gravitas (second persona), he has chosen to strengthen and develop this
through his choice of life-path (fourth persona),32 and the happy correlation (aequabilitas)
between all the different aspects of his nature contributed by each of the four personae has
given him the ability to persevere with this gravitas in exceptional circumstances
(constantia).33 This perfect and productive harmony of the whole package of the four
personae is what Gill calls the ‘structured wholeness’ of the individual.34 If you make the
right decisions about your way in life so that all personae are in harmony at an early
stage, then in any given situation you have no need to start a new calculation from scratch
about what moral action is required from you, but can simply act in consistency with the
harmonious moral self that you have been developing over the course of your lifetime.
Cicero draws attention several times to the implications that this framework of situation
ethics has for the Roman exemplary tradition of striving to emulate great gures of the
past. We should imitate others and follow their example only if we are equipped by
nature to do so: there is no point ‘pursuing something that you can’t reach’ (‘sequi quod
adsequi non queas’, 1.110) and ‘you cannot preserve [the aequabilitas of your whole life
that decorum requires] if you imitate the nature of other people, ignoring your own
nature’ (‘quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam’, 1.111).35
The implications of these statements are that we must be careful how we use exempla.
Cicero rst spells this out in relation to imitation of our own ancestors, whom we should
usually strive to imitate, but not if ‘our own nature does not support us in being able to
imitate them in some respect’ (‘si natura non feret ut quaedam imitari possint’, 1.121).
The same caveats are in place when it comes to using traditional exempla from history,
which relate the deeds of truly exceptional individuals whose capabilities are likely to far
exceed our own. The very specic circumstances and personal qualities that made the
behaviour of exemplary gures right for them are unlikely to be present for the ordinary
Roman moral agent, so mere imitation of their acts is likely to be inappropriate: ‘And no
one should be led astray by this error, into judging that, because Socrates or Aristippus
did or said something against custom or social convention, they too have the same licence’
(‘nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem
consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur licere’, 1.148).
Cicero’s framework of sensitivity to situational variability, including the four-personae
theory, allows general moral precepts to offer guidance which can be exibly applied by the
moral agent according to their own circumstances, both external and personal, rather than
prescriptive rules about what should be done by any good person in any given set of
circumstances.36 As Inwood suggests, there are distinct similarities between the ideas we
op. cit. (n. 22 ), 13–34; Gill, op. cit. (n. 25); and A. Hobbs, ‘On Christopher Gill “Particulars, Selves and
Individuals in Stoic Philosophy”’, in Sharples, op. cit. (n. 25), 147–55. On what it can tell us about Roman
attitudes to death and self-killing, see T. Hill, Ambitiosa Mors: Suicide and Self in Roman Thought and
Literature (2004), 67–71 and C. Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome (2007), 147–9.
32 1.112: ‘Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem, eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset,
semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset …’
33 Gill, op. cit. (n. 23), 185; cf. Gill, op. cit. (n. 25), 141: ‘although consistency is the general goal for everyone,
Cato is also presented as exceptional in the consistency with which he has maintained his natural disposition on a
life-long basis.’ On which see Hobbs, op. cit. (n. 31), 153: ‘Gill is absolutely right to highlight the importance of
constantia and aequabilitas in Stoic (and Stoic-Roman) thought as foundational organising concepts.’
34 Gill, op. cit. (n. 25), 130.
35 cf. Gill, op. cit. (n. 23), 178.
36 Gill, op. cit. (n. 25), 137: ‘The four-personae theory is introduced as providing a co-ordinated set of reference
points by which we can establish what is decorum/prepon (which we might translate as “just right”)’, see n. 29
above.
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nd here and those found in Seneca’s Letters 94 and 95 relating to the need for exibility
and situational variability.37 However, Cicero makes it clear that the same situational
sensitivity is required when it comes to reading exempla and applying them to one’s
own moral development and moral decision-making too.
An important corollary of all of this is that anyone who aspires to moral rightness and
decorum needs to have a very clear grasp of his or her own strengths and weaknesses.38
Throughout these passages Cicero uses the language of perception — seeming and
recognizing — to evoke this process of moral judgement,39 as does Valerius with the
terms videretur and cognoscitur in 6.2.5 discussed above; both thereby highlight the fact
that accurate perception of moral value both in oneself and in others is difcult as well
as being of the utmost importance. Valerius’ work will also offer the reading of exempla
as one means of developing this self-knowledge, by measuring oneself against the
exemplary gures of the past.
III CONFIDENCE (FIDUCIA) AND SITUATIONAL VARIABILITY
In the exemplum about Cato with which I began Section I, the quality which one was able
to recognize (cognoscitur) in Cato thanks to his particular persona was ducia —
condence. This is a quality which demands, of course, a high degree of accurate
self-knowledge, since misplaced condence in oneself has the potential to be
disastrous.40 Valerius devotes chapter 3.7 to this quality of self-condence, which
follows a chapter (3.6) on the related subject of great men who exercise some licence in
their behaviour and who break with convention, and is followed by chapter 3.8 on the
very same quality — constantia (consistency) — which, for Cicero, is the key to bringing
all the personal contingencies into harmony. My discussion will show that Valerius’
ducia (when conceived positively) is very closely related to moral consistency of the
kind embodied, in Cicero’s account, in Cato the Younger, since it involves a knowledge
of one’s strengths that enables one to forge ahead with implementing one’s moral plans
and decisions even in the face of adversity or the misgivings of others. It is also highly
contingent on personal qualities and self-knowledge; as Cicero warns us in de Ofciis,
sometimes great men can get away with doing things that run counter to the agreed
common morality, but these acts would be entirely inappropriate for others, and we
should be careful not to be seduced into thinking that imitating them is the right course
of action.41 This means that exempla must be read very carefully, and, as we shall see,
in 3.7 Valerius Maximus makes this same point. However, he also provides scope
through his examples and comments for a more detailed consideration of the
implications of this precept for ethical decision-making.
Valerius introduces the material in this chapter with the claim that the examples he cites
here will allow it ‘to be understood how much self-condence virtue is accustomed to have’
(‘illis autem, quae deinceps subnectam, quantam sui duciam [virtus] habere soleat
cognoscitur’, 3.7.pr.). The chapter begins by asserting, in other words, that condence
in oneself is a characteristic of virtus (moral worth). It concludes in similar fashion, after
Valerius has related the twenty-seven tales that provide its exemplary meat, by
reiterating the close connection between ducia and moral rectitude, describing: ‘…the
37 Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 110 and 123–30 for his discussion of de Ofciis which focuses primarily on Book 3.
38 1.114: ‘suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat.’
39 In addition to the passages cited here, see the use of videre in de Off. 2.9 and 3.34.
40 See Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 155, cited above.
41 de Off. 1.148.
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open and spirited breast of good condence’ (‘apertum et animosum bonae duciae
pectus’, 3.8.pr), and saying:
For nature has organized things in such a way that if someone is condent that he has
embraced an endeavour properly and in the right frame of mind, if it has already been
completed, he will defend it vehemently if someone criticizes it, and if it has not yet been
completed and someone tries to prevent him, he will carry it out without any hesitation.
natura enim sic comparatum est ut quisquis se aliquid ordine ac recte mente complexum
condit, vel iam gestum, si obtrectetur, acriter tueatur, vel nondum editum, si interpelletur,
sine ulla cunctatione ad effectum perducat. (3.8.pr.)
Fiducia, then, is the quality that enables one to translate one’s knowledge of one’s own
strengths and talents into the capacity to persevere with one’s chosen path and stick to
one’s moral principles. It engenders the quality of constantia which is the subject of
chapter 3.8, and which Cicero describes as the organizing principle of the four personae
in a moral individual. We can already see this consistency in action in the long series of
condent deeds listed in 3.7.1, which are all the actions of a single man, Scipio
Africanus. His behaviour is described as ‘so resolute’ (‘tam constantem’, 3.7.1f),42 and
Valerius comments on his ability repeatedly to enact virtues in his chosen eld of
excellence: ‘I will not weary in relating over and over again the deeds of this man, since
he was not wearied either by enacting virtues in the same way’ (‘non fatigabor eiusdem
facta identidem referendo, quoniam ne ille quidem in consimili genere virtutes edendo
fatigatus est’, 3.7.1g).
In these opening exempla, as in the chapter prefaces cited above, ducia is represented
both as the consequence of virtue and as virtue’s tool, enabling virtue to carry out its
plans; in any case it is on the side of moral right (although, as we shall see, during the
course of the chapter this close relationship between virtue and self-condence is shown to
be somewhat problematic). Valerius’ authorial comment upon each of these exempla lays
consistent emphasis on the benecial effect of such condent acts. In the rst story ducia
brings hope of safety and victory to the Roman people (3.7.1a), in the third it secures the
end of the Second Punic War (3.7.1c), next it intimidates the enemy and crushes their
spirits (3.7.1d; see also 3.7.5, 3.7.6), and procures justice for the falsely accused (3.7.1e;
see also 3.7.1g, 3.7.7, 3.7.8, 3.7.9) and funds for the needy state (3.7.1f). Taken together,
these early sections convey a coherent sense of the positive effect of self-condence and
what it can achieve. Valerius’ comment on Scipio’s bold prediction of his capture of Baria
in 3.7.1b portrays condence as aiming high, and reaching into the uncertain future to
achieve its aims: ‘Nothing is more noble spirited than this condence, nothing more true
than this prediction, nothing more effective than this swiftness, nothing more honourable
than this honourableness’ (‘nihil hac ducia generosius, nihil praedictione verius, nihil
celeritate efcacius, nihil etiam dignitate dignius’). The chapter proceeds with eight more
examples of the ducia of Roman individuals, then two examples of the Senate’s ducia
(3.7.10). A nal Roman example featuring the poet Accius leads into the rst group of
ve external examples devoted to the arts (3.7.11–3.7.ext.4), and then we return to public
and military spheres with the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal and King Cotys,
rounded off with three spirited retorts from anonymous Spartans.
One motif that runs through the chapter is ducia’s rôle in enabling people to stand up
to the blows of Fortune, and even to turn misfortune to their advantage. This is implicit in
42 In labelling sections 1a, 1b etc. I follow here the numbering of the Loeb Classical Library edition of
D. R. Shackleton Bailey (ed. and trans.), Valerius Maximus: Memorable Doings and Sayings. Two Volumes
(2000) which differentiates more clearly between the individual exemplary anecdotes than the Teubner edition,
J. Briscoe (ed.), Valerii Maximi Facta et Dicta Memorabilia (1998).
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some of the early examples, but made explicit towards the end of the Roman section in
3.7.10b, where Valerius comments on the Senate’s act in sending reinforcements to
Spain: ‘To behave like this in adversity — what is this other than to convert savage
fortune, conquered by shame, into one’s assistant?’ (‘ita se gerere in adversis rebus quid
alius est quam saevientem fortunam in adiutorium sui pudore victam convertere?’,
3.7.10b). The closing examples of the foreign section also emphasize this: Epaminondas
transforms his public humiliation into a source of honour and distinction (3.7.ext.5) and
the lame Spartan turns his disability into an indication of bravery on the battleeld (3.7.
ext.8). Antigenidas’ advice to his unsuccessful pupil in the second foreign example also
pits condence against Fortune, and uses ill fortune as a spur. Antigenidas tells him to
‘play for me and for the Muses’ and to disregard the lack of popular enthusiasm for his
ute playing:
Certainly, perfect art is not stripped of justied condence merely because it lacks fortune’s
attery, and it knows itself to be deserving of praise, and if it does not obtain praise from
other people it turns to that received closer to home.
quia videlicet perfecta ars fortunae lenocinio defecta iusta ducia non exuitur, quamque se scit
laudem mereri, eam si ab aliis non impetrat, domestico tamen acceptam iudicio refert. (3.7.
ext.2)
On the face of it, the chapter provides an optimistic demonstration of the power of the
individual in the face of Fortune, which in fact cuts against the grain of Valerius’ work
where more usually, as in Roman popular morality generally, the power of Fortune is
pre-eminent and mortals must resign themselves to it. Here we see the possibility of
high-status individuals ourishing even as they depart from conventional moral guidelines.
However, this chapter does not simply proclaim that great men can break the rules. A
common pattern in Valerius’ chapters is that they start by building rather a clear and
inspiring sense of a moral quality, often based on well-known and high-status heroic
acts, and then proceed, in the latter part of a chapter, to give a sense of the ethical
problems associated with that moral quality and the kind of ethical pitfalls the reader
might like to look out for.43 In this case, there is an increasing sense that breaking the
rules is problematic and one needs to be very careful, in case one misjudges what is
required by a situation.44 The part of the chapter which particularly addresses itself to
this, is that which spans the end of the Roman exempla and the beginning of the foreign
section (3.7.11–3.7.ext.4), and which forms a short subsection in which every example
is set in the eld of the arts.
In this subsection, as I shall show, Valerius indicates the limits of ducia and its
proximity to the bad qualities of arrogance, contempt and insolence. The condent
actions described are presented on the face of it as praiseworthy, but at the same time it
is also made clear how close they come to wrongful behaviour, and indeed how difcult
it can be to distinguish right from wrong. In particular, the section shows the same
sensitivity to the requirements of individual circumstances that Cicero espouses in de
Ofciis and that Teresa Morgan identies as a key feature of Roman popular morality.
The key passage here is the exemplum of Accius in 3.7.11, which forms the link
between the Roman political context that precedes it and the foreign artistic context that
43 See Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8) for analysis of how this functions in Val. Max. 2.7 and 6.3 and R. Langlands,
Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (2006), ch. 3 on Val. Max. 6.1.
44 The acts inspired by condence involve breaking the rules: Scipio acts against the Senate’s orders (senatu
vetante 3.7.1c), tears up accounts in the Senate House (3.7.1e), and appears to act contrary to the law (3.7.1f).
Daring, of course, always risks spilling into culpable rashness, as 3.7.5 reminds us: ‘duciam non solum fortem
sed paene etiam temerariam.’ Moreover the rejection of Carthage’s offer of help during the war against
Pyrrhus might be seen as downright ungracious and highhanded (3.7.10).
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comes next. Valerius introduces his deed as having a very different setting from the
previous exempla, which related acts of the Senate during the Punic wars: ‘the transition
from the Senate to the poet Accius is divided by a great space’ (‘magno spatio divisus est
a senatu ad poetam Accium transitus’, 3.7.11). This phrase heightens the reader’s
awareness of the signicance of changing context. The story itself then enacts the
principle that the evaluation of an act depends very closely on the specic setting in
which it is performed. The setting here is the College of Poets. It is here that the poet
Accius fails to show deference to his social superior Julius Caesar. Nonetheless this
failure is judged to be condonable on two very specic grounds: (a) that it took place in
this very specic setting and (b) that Accius’ estimation of his own literary superiority is
accurate.
He never stood up to greet Julius Caesar when that most powerful and successful man entered
the College of Poets, not because he was unaware of the latter’s great status, but because in
comparison of the studies that they held in common he was condent that he was
considerably the superior.
is Iulio Caesari, amplissimo ac orentissimo viro, in collegium poetarum venienti numquam
adsurrrexit, non maiestatis eius immemor sed quod in comparatione communium studiorum
aliquanto se superiorem esse conderet. (3.7.11)
Accius was right because, there, in that particular place— ibi— he was the superior. ‘That is
why he was not accused of insolence, because in that place the competition was between
scrolls of poetry and not ancestral portraits’ (‘quapropter insolentiae crimine caruit, quia
ibi voluminum non imaginum certamina exercebantur’, 3.7.11). However, the same act in
any other setting would have been wrong. Valerius exonerates him from any charge of
insolence, but, of course, the exoneration quite plainly raises the spectre of this crimen
insolentiae, and suggests that outside the College of Poets it would have been entirely
applicable. It is only in this particularly location and because of the specic literary
standing of the person in question that such behaviour can be interpreted favourably.
In the following example, Euripides similarly ‘does not appear arrogant either’ (‘ne
Euripides quidem Athenis adrogans visus est’, 3.7.ext.1) when he tells his audience that
he is accustomed to teaching them, not learning from them. Valerius claims:
Certainly, condence is praiseworthy when it measures its own worth against a reliable scale,
arrogant only so far as to leave enough of a distance from contempt and insolence.
laudanda profecto ducia est quae aestimationem sui certo pondere examinat, tantum sibi
adrogans quantum a contemptu et insolentia distare satis est. (3.7.ext.1)
In this authorial comment a boundary is drawn between condence in oneself and
insolence (and here ‘contempt’ as well) and the formulation ‘far enough’ — satis —
emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the line drawn between virtue and vice and one’s
need to make a ne judgement about where that line should be drawn; the punning
repetition of adrogans draws attention to this as well. The phrase certo pondere is
particularly provocative: what is this ‘certain scale’ against which one must measure
oneself? To be sure, Valerius offers no answer to this question — one that also
preoccupied Seneca — about how one can tell whether one’s own moral judgements are
accurate.45 However, reading exempla is certainly one way to learn how one should
measure and evaluate oneself, and an established exemplum might be posited as a
‘certain scale’ against which readers might measure themselves.
45 Hill, op. cit. (n. 31), 157.
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The signicance of context for moral evaluation is also elaborated in this chapter in two
further aspects, neither of which are agged as explicitly as in the passages I have looked at
so far. The rst aspect is the presence or absence of the ‘greater good’ of the community as
a broader setting for any act; this is of particular relevance to the highly structured
value-system that Valerius’ work espouses, with its neat division of exempla into Roman
and foreign — inclusive, yet at the same time distinctly Romano-centric. The second is
the issue that exemplary acts may be evaluated in hindsight, when we already know
their consequences, in a way that the acts which moral agents decide to perform cannot
at the moment of decision; this disparity is an inherent problem in the exemplary
process since it creates an obstacle to comparing one’s own situation to those of
exemplary gures from history.
On the rst issue, notice the dramatic shift in tone between the rst Roman section
containing the deeds of Scipio and the section dealing with examples from the arts that I
have just discussed. In the rst part of the chapter, the benet of every act is described
in terms of its benet to the whole Roman community. In the ‘Arts’ section, there is no
wider political or military context and the condence serves no purpose beyond its own
display.46 Valerius introduces the second anecdote about Euripides in this section (at
3.7.ext.1b) by calling his behaviour probabile (laudable). However, Euripides’ reported
conversation with Alcestis — a fellow playwright47 — goes like this: Euripides rst
complains how slow his writing is going; Alcestis replies that he has been knocking out
the lines with ease; Euripides responds, ‘But your lines will only last for three days,
while mine shall last eternity’. The whole conversation seems entirely contrived to
humiliate his fellow poet.48 What is the ‘moral value’ of such condence? What does it
serve beyond itself?
Valerius explains that hindsight proves Euripides emphatically right to have such faith in
his own genius: ‘Since the writings of the other man, with their productive speed, fell at the
rst hurdle of memory, while his own works, laboriously composed with halting pen, will be
borne on the full sails of glory through all eternity’ (‘alterius enim fecundi cursus scripta intra
primas memoriae metas corruerunt, alterius cunctante stilo elucubratum opus per omne aevi
tempus plenis gloriae velis feretur’, 3.7.ext.1b). What happened next, as laid bare by
hindsight, makes all the difference to our evaluation of Euripides’ ‘rightness’. At rst
reading, this is hardly comforting for the serious, ethically-minded reader of exempla, who
is trying to work out how to translate an exemplary deed into guidance for their own
behaviour. Hindsight may appear to make it easier to judge past actions — too easy in
fact — but it is no help at all in assessing the rights and wrongs of decisions taken in the
present, where the future consequences are unknown. Moreover, it runs counter to the
message of many other Roman exempla, where good and brave men are punished for not
following correct procedure even when their actions turn out to be highly benecial to
Rome.49 In this section the overall thrust seems to be that the consequences justify the act.
46 Indeed with the Phidias anecdote of 3.7.ext.4 the chapter seems to have lost its way entirely and conveys no
moral message at all, since it picks up the theme of a visual artist taking lines from Homer as his inspiration,
but without the self-referential boast of Zeuxis in the preceding exemplum.
47 The name Alcestis is almost certainly an error; perhaps Acestor, a playwright contemporary with Euripides, is
meant (see Shackleton Bailey op. cit. (n. 42), ad loc.).
48 And as such may have some resonance with the earlier story of Rome’s rejection of Carthage’s offer of help in
3.7.10a, see n. 44 above.
49 See especially the earlier chapter 2.7 on military discipline with discussion in Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8), 169–78.
The contradictory moral guidelines found in different parts of Valerius’ work remind us that, for all his
commentary upon ethics, Valerius is not attempting a consistent philosophical account of an ethical system;
instead exempla provide ad hoc examples of ethical responses to difcult situations. However, it is also the
case that these contradictions reect moral tensions inherent in the Roman ethical system between the
competing criteria for moral evaluation which are available to moral agents. On the deliberately controversial
nature of exempla, see further Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8).
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The phrase comparing two of Scipio’s bold deeds early in the chapter summarizes this
attitude concisely: ‘no less spirited and no less successful’ (‘nec minus animosus minusve
prosperus …’, 3.7.1b). That his actions are both bold and successful stands in this chapter
as praise, and success is itself grounds for praise.
However, these examples are not to be read so much as telling us about the importance
of literary talent or bold leadership but rather as having a nuanced message, which expands
upon Cicero’s Cato exemplum, about the way that great men manage the relationship
between their natural characteristics and their moral choices. The reader is not invited to
imitate Euripides’ condence in his own artistic genius, but to appreciate and emulate
his ability to measure his own worth against a certain scale, know what behaviour is
appropriate for him, and have the strength to maintain it consistently. In the terms of
Cicero’s four-personae theory, Euripides has made a good and well-informed choice of
his fourth persona as a playwright, based on his literary talents that nature has given
him in his second persona; this story shows that what really allows him to make the
most of this choice is the condence that enables him to persevere even when it is hard
work, and to stand up for himself even at the risk of seeming rude and arrogant in front
of a colleague; his behaviour will not necessarily make him a good person, but it makes
him a good playwright and a consistent Euripides.50
In the real world, however, ethical choices have uncertain outcomes and involve
risk-taking. Unlike the actions of exemplary heroes, the decisions made by a reader in
the here and now cannot be validated by the knowledge of what their consequences will
be and whether their choice of life-path will prove successful. The chapter does not spell
this out; nevertheless the story of Accius sounds a warning that it is often very hard to
tell what the appropriate action is, and that you may be a hair’s breadth away from
making a damaging mistake. As Teresa Morgan has pointed out, a recurrent concern in
Roman popular morality is that if you identify with the wrong person in an exemplary
tale you can end up in hot water.51 But how do you know if you are a great man or
not, or have what it takes to follow in the footsteps of a great man? In the story of
Accius, the evaluation is taken out of the strictly moral sphere and into the artistic and
the social spheres, as parallel situations in which such judgements are hard to make. In
order to be sure he is making the right decision, Accius needs to be able to rate his
literary worth accurately against that of Julius Caesar, and he needs to make an
accurate judgement about how that will weigh against his relative social standing. Once
again this is not merely a case of Accius deciding how to act in one particular setting;
the context is his previous choice to develop his natural talents and become a poet, and
his subsequent condence in and commitment to that choice, all of which enables him
to know that he is the superior of Julius Caesar. All this adds up to a set of
generalizable precepts: to decide how to act in the Roman world you need a very ne
moral and social sensibility,52 accurate self-knowledge and a knowledge of the moral
scale against which you must measure yourself, and a commitment to your chosen path.
Another message about situational variability, in somewhat cruder form, rounds off the
chapter. The last sentence briey relates the pithy response of a Spartan who is being
shown the impressive defensive walls of another man’s town. He retorts that the walls
50 It is clear that here we must understand ethics in a rather broad sense, rather strictly pertaining to the good and
virtuous, as seems to be the case also in Cicero, de Ofciis, on which see Gill, op. cit. (n. 23), 188–92. See also the
idea of artistic talent as parallel to moral virtue in the case of Accius, below.
51 ‘If we identify with the wrong character [in a moralizing narrative] or pick the wrong piece of advice, we are
liable to suffer disastrously for it’ (Morgan, op. cit. (n. 1), 188; see further 179–90).
52 See R. A. Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) for an extremely interesting
exploration of how this idea might have functioned in Roman culture; he provides extended discussion of the
regulatory emotions of verecundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia and fastidium. On de Ofciis see pp. 17–18
with n. 11 on p. 154.
ROMAN EXEMPLA AND SITUATION ETHICS 115
are ‘ne, if you built them for women; shameful, if you built them for men’ (‘si mulieribus
istos comparastis, recte, si viris, turpiter’, 3.7.ext.8).53 This brief quip deploys the old cliché
of comparing men to women as a straightforward insult,54 implying that only sissies build
walls to protect themselves rather than relying on their own valour. However, by offering
opposite evaluations of the act of building the walls if done for women (right) and for men
(shameful), it reminds us of the need to exercise careful judgement about what can be
expected of different kinds of individual. Now, we are clearly not supposed to conclude
from this story that it is actually shameful to have walls protecting one’s city. The
Spartan’s banter is triumphant, but the reader is not expected to swallow his line and
believe that his stance on urban fortication is actually the more valid. Rather, the joke
serves to round off the chapter with a reminder that moral acts look different from
different perspectives. It is a clever witticism that requires one to look at a familiar
situation from an unfamiliar angle and to give it thereby a new moral slant. It reminds
us that considering a variety of moral perspectives and alternatives is the best way fully
to understand the nuances of ethical issues.
IV NECESSITAS AND SITUATIONAL VARIABILITY
One of the points that Cicero makes about situational variability in the rst book of de
Ofciis is that the circumstances brought about by necessitas (dire necessity) may have a
radical effect on the moral evaluation of an act. His statement of this principle comes in
a section where he is arguing that the mark of true wisdom is the ability to weigh up all
the various alternatives in advance, so that you never have to say: ‘I hadn’t thought of
that.’55 The prudent person will not rule out the possibility that he may, in some
circumstances, be required to act in a way that looks on the face of it as if it is wrong.
Hurling oneself rashly into battle and ghting hand to hand with the enemy, for
instance, is a bestial act (simile beluarum) and monstrous (immane) — but every now
and then, in extreme circumstances, it is the right thing to do: ‘but when the occasion
and necessity demand it, one must ght hand to hand, and death should be placed
before slavery and shame’ (‘sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu
est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda’, 1.81).56 Cicero ends this book, on the
other hand, by stressing that there are some acts that are so grotesque that they are
never acceptable under any circumstances: ‘There are some acts that are so disgusting,
some that are so transgressive, that a wise man would not undertake them even to save
his country’ (‘sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita agitiosa, ut ea ne
conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus sit’, 1.159).57 For Cicero, although
one’s obligation to the community (communitas) and the patriotic obligation to defend
and preserve one’s country are usually of paramount importance, they should not be
placed above the obligations imposed by moderatio and modestia (1.159.)
53 See Plutarch, Sayings of the Spartans for the same one-liner attributed to a variety of Spartans. Valerius quite
often rounds off his chapters with the sayings and deeds of anonymous Spartans: 3.2.ext.5; 4.1.ext.8; 4.5.ext.2;
4.6.ext.3; 6.4.ext.5.
54 Again echoing the insulting responses of the Senate and of Euripides earlier in the chapter, see nn. 44 and 48
above.
55 This famous idea that it is shameful to have to confess ‘non putaram’ also appears elsewhere in Valerius
Maximus, at 7.2.2, where the sentiment is attributed to none other than Scipio Africanus.
56 cf. 1.34–5 where this sentiment is also set out as a doctrine of Panaetius (see Dyck, op. cit. (n. 14), ad loc.) and
also 2.56 which will be discussed below.
57 Note the mention of the sapiens here. Dyck suggests this is an echo of his source Posidonius who may have been
referring to the Stoic sage in his original discussion (Dyck, op. cit. (n. 14), ad loc.).
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Cicero forbears to describe here the kinds of disgusting acts that might be included in
this category, saying that Posidonius — who taught Cicero in Rhodes in 78 B.C. — has
collected many examples of these, but that it would be shameful to repeat them. A wise
man, Cicero tells us, would not want to perform such acts for the sake of his country,
but neither would his country wish him to perform such acts on its behalf.58 Cicero’s
refusal to specify any examples, and his apparently contradictory assertions about the
shameful act of dancing in the forum (at 3.93), leave the reader of de Ofciis unsure
where the line is to be drawn when it comes to deciding which acts, precisely, are to be
considered beyond the requirements of modestia. Valerius Maximus, however, in his
chapter on necessitas (Val. Max. 7.6) brings together these unexplored and potentially
conicting precepts from Cicero, de Ofciis, and through his choice of and comment
upon exempla, goes a little further towards working through their ethical implications.
Necessitas in Valerius Maximus, like the external forces of Natura and Fortuna, is
neither a virtue nor a vice, but a constraint upon human behaviour and an imposer of
difcult circumstances. It is an impersonal force acting upon the lives of men with her
‘bitterest laws and cruellest commands’, as we see in Valerius’ preface (‘amarissimae
leges et truculentissima imperia’, 7.6.pr.).59 In this chapter the reader is evidently not
directed to imitate or to avoid the cited exempla, but rather to re-examine certain moral
assumptions about right and wrong behaviour. Necessitas is most terrible and most
horric — the extremeness and the horror emphasized by Valerius’ description of it as
abominandae (7.6.pr) and taeterrimae (7.6.4) and by his assertion that the deeds that
necessitas forces men to perform, and which he is about to relate, are gravia even to
hear about, let alone to experience. This sensitivity to the effect of speaking and hearing
about such things may remind us of Cicero’s squeamishness about the list of terrible
acts compiled by Posidonius, but, unlike Cicero, Valerius will go on to spell out certain
acts that can have no moral justication; his chapter ends by expressing his horror at,
and moral censure of, the ultimate abomination — killing and eating one’s own children.
Cannibalism appears regularly in Stoic thought as a test case for exploring the universal
applicability of moral rules and the doctrine of ‘special circumstances’.60 The point is that
although one might assume that a rule such as the prohibition on eating human esh would
apply to everyone at all times, in fact even a rule such as this might be relaxed in very
exceptional circumstances (and specically for a Stoic sage).61 In this chapter Valerius
also uses cannibalism — alongside stealing from temples, self-killing and self-mutilation,
also themes used in Stoic debates about special circumstances62 — to represent generally
58 ‘Ea Posidonius conlegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec
igitur non suscipiet reipublica causa, ne respublica quidem pro se suscipi volet’ (1.159).
59 It is comparable in rôle to the whimsical Nature as depicted in Book 1 (1.8.ext.18), or elsewhere either a
component of inescapable fate or bad fortuna leading to desperate circumstances (1.7.ext.4, 1.8.ext.10, 2.10.6,
4.3.7, 5.3.ext.3, 7.3.8, 7.6.1a, 8.1.absol.6, 9.8.2).
60 cf. P. Vander Waerdt, ‘Zeno’s Republic and the origins of Natural Law’, in P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The
Socratic Movement (1994), 272–308, at 300: ‘I suggest that Zeno considered incest and cannibalism as test
cases of moral prohibitions that might be thought to apply without exception. His argument in reply would be
that there may indeed be certain special circumstances — namely when there is a divergence between the
common nature and the individual nature — in which these practices would accord with nature.’
61 See Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 102 on cannibalism as something that a Stoic sage might consider in the right
circumstances. In Juv., Sat. 15.93–109 the siege of Calagurris, described at Val. Max. 7.6.ext.3, is used as an
example of the kind of mitigating circumstances where cannibalism might be acceptable. However, the claim in
lines 106–7 that ‘melius nos Zenonis praecepta monent’ (‘we know better because of Zeno’s teachings’) is best
seen as an indication of the ignorance of the satirical speaker of the poem, who has misunderstood entirely the
Stoic position (on this see R. McKim, ‘Philosophers and cannibals: Juvenal’s fteenth satire’, Phoenix 40
(1986), 58–71, especially 65–6). See also Ps.-Quint., MD 12; both texts have a lot of fun revelling in the
horrors of cannibalism.
62 Diogenes Laertius 6.72–3 and cf. 7.109 on mutilation; 7.121 ‘on special circumstances’; 7.130 on the Stoic idea
that a wise man will kill himself under certain circumstances.
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unacceptable acts that might be rendered acceptable under certain circumstances. However,
by the end of the chapter Valerius Maximus has shown, through a handful of stories about
people who get this wrong with horric consequences, that one needs to be very careful in
assessing precisely what these circumstances might be.
As well as having the usual formal division into Roman and foreign exempla, Valerius’
chapter may be thematically divided into two subsections; the rst subsection (7.6.1–3)
contains exempla set in the most desperate times of the Second Punic War, the second
(7.6.4–7.6.ext.3) contains Roman exempla set during the Civil War and then foreign
examples from three different siege situations. These two sections parallel one another,
inviting comparison in such a way as to bring out the importance of context in
establishing the moral value of the various acts they describe. Valerius makes this point
explicitly, especially in the rst of these subsections, but it is also emphasized by the
very structure of the chapter. Each subsection has the same shape to it: the rst exempla
describe the unusual means resorted to when Rome was running out of supplies and
manpower in military situations, and the nal exempla of each section describe the
terrible things resorted to by men driven by extremes of hunger during a siege situation.
However, while the exempla in the rst subsection are directed towards the defence and
preservation of the Roman state, and towards the end of the section have a distinctly
morally uplifting and exemplary effect,63 the stories in the second subsection, set in the
morally dubious Civil War era (7.6.4–6) and then in siege situations where the attacker
is Rome (7.6.ext.1–3), are able to provide no such moral reassurance, and the gures in
the nal example are lower than beasts in their confusing of moral priorities.
Valerius draws attention to the parallels and contrasts between these subsections at the
start of 7.6.4, which opens the second subsection with the rst of the Civil War exempla.
This subsection describes how during the Civil War between Marius and Sulla ‘gold and
silver temple ornaments were melted down so that the soldiers should not go unpaid’
(‘aurea atque argentea templorum ornamenta, ne militibus stipendia deessent, conata
sunt’, 7.6.4). This echoes the exemplum at the start of the Punic War section, where a
lack of resources results in the re-using of consecrated temple ornaments: ‘Enemy spoils
xed to the temples and consecrated to the power of the gods were torn down to be
used as weapons for the soldiers’ (‘spolia hostium adxa templis, deorum numini
consecrata, instrumento militiae futura convellerentur’, 7.6.1b). There is perhaps an
implicit contrast here between redeploying consecrated enemy spoils, which were after
all created as weapons even if they now decorate a temple, and melting down temple
ornaments to make coins for pay, which has a faint evocation of avarice about it. This
makes the example set in the Civil War less morally palatable than the one set in the
Punic War. However, Valerius makes the compromised moral context of the era explicit
with his next sarcastic comment, suggesting that the Civil War period provided a very
particular sort of context, which actually drained the virtue out of any acts that were
performed at that time. He has introduced this section by describing it as a time
(tempus) in which ‘it was not that victory was sought for the republic, but that the
republic was the prize for victory’ (‘non rei publicae victoria quaerebatur sed praemium
victoriae res erat publica’),64 and he now retorts: ‘Since it was for an honourable cause
that the immortal gods were despoiled — that both sides might sate their cruelty
through the proscription of civilians!’ (‘digna enim causa erat, hine an illi crudelitatem
suam proscriptione civium satierent, ut di immortales spoliarentur!’, 7.6.4). Finally, this
Civil War section — and indeed the whole Roman part of the chapter — is rounded off
63 7.6.2: ‘in propinquo situm Casilium, incolarum virtute clarum, perseverantis amicitiae pignore impios oculos
verberavit.’
64 cf. 7.6.1b for the Punic War described as a tempus, i.e. providing a particular temporal context: temporis
convenientia.
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by the claim that the imperial regime established by Augustus and under which Valerius is
now writing65 has brought to an end desperate times such as those described, which could
just about excuse the desperate acts they engendered: ‘This most bitter of storms was driven
away by the guardianship of Augustus, available in those days for the protection of the
earth’ (‘sed amarissimam tempestatem Augusti cura, tutelae tunc terrarum vacans,
dispulit’, 7.6.6). Necessitas is thus sealed into discrete historical packets, suggesting that
such circumstances do not pertain in contemporary Rome and there is no longer any
excuse for atrocious acts.
The structure of the chapter, then, highlights the idea that different contexts, and
especially different historical settings, lend a different moral signicance to acts
performed in them. The precepts that are explicitly stated in the rst part of this chapter
on necessitas also set out in detail the ideas about situational variability found in de
Ofciis. Extreme circumstances disrupt the natural order of things, meaning that quite
different kinds of ethical rules apply.66 In some cases one must turn aside from the
glorious (speciosa) path to follow the safer (tutiora) path: ‘at times the noble spirit yields
to utility and gives in to the powers of fortune, when, if you don’t choose the safer plan,
following the glorious plan will get you struck down’ (‘cedit ergo interdum generosus
spiritus utilitati et fortunae viribus succumbit, ubi, nisi tutiora consilia legeris, speciosa
sequenti concidendum est’, 7.6.1).67 Acts performed under such circumstances look
shameful if they are judged on their own merits, but viewed in context are seen to be
appropriate responses to the situation: ‘These acts, if they are examined for themselves,
look somewhat shameful, but if they are weighed against the forces of necessity they
seem defensive action appropriate to the cruelty of the time’ (‘quae si per se aspiciantur,
aliquid ruboris habeant, si autem admotis necessitatis viribus pondererentur, saevitiae
temporis convenientia praesidia videantur’, 7.6.1). Acts that seem in themselves
wretched and grim can actually be understood as manifestations of great and admirable
virtue. Thus the recruitment of slaves, children, debtors and even convicted criminals to
ght the enemy, or the refusal of the Senate to give support to its provincial allies in
their hour of need, look like immoral deeds, especially where Rome does not full her
responsibilities at the helm of the empire. However, they are actually justied by the
exigencies of the hour — the command of necessitas. In the same spirit of being brought
to the most unworthy and undignied acts through necessity, the besieged inhabitants of
Casilium are reduced to eating boiled leather from their shield straps (7.6.2). This
exemplum may not have quite the same moral edge as the preceding ones, but it
supports justicatory interpretations of the previous Roman exempla; the worthy people
of Casilium were able to last out the siege because of eating the practically inedible, and
likewise Rome was able reverse her fortunes and rise again to eminence through these
measures that she had taken in this time of disaster. In context, all these measures are
justiable; the reader must use hindsight to make this judgement; at the time the moral
agent making the decision to take such measures must rely on their own self-condence
to predict the outcome.
The nal example in this series set in the Second Punic War (7.6.3) ts these precepts less
well than the preceding exempla, and looks at rst sight as if it has been appended because
of its supercial similarities to 7.6.2. It took place ‘at the same time and during the same
siege’ and also illustrates the effects of extreme hunger. However, it also introduces into the
chapter the key theme of monetary ination, which provides an analogy to the uctuating
65 His work is dedicated to the emperor Tiberius and was probably published c. A.D. 30.
66 ‘quanta violentia est casus acerbi’, 7.6.1.
67 In Valerius’ work being speciosus is usually something to aspire to, especially in a military context. See e.g.
2.7.1, 5, 6, 8 and 15; 3.7.1g, 10a and ext.5; 6.3.1b and 10a (and cf. 1.1.14; 3.2.7, 20, ext.4 on fortitudo;
3.5.1a). The term generosus also draws a particular contrast with chapter 3.7 (3.7.1a and ext.7); cf. 3.3.pr. on
the generous spirit of fortitudo and patientia.
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ethical value of acts. This theme alludes to Cicero, de Ofciis 2.56 (on which see below)
and is also picked up again a page or so later in Val. Max. 7.6.6, the nal Roman
example of the chapter.
Cicero’s reference to the exorbitant price of basic necessities during times of crisis is
made in a context where it forms a rather neat and complicated double comparison (de
Off. 2.56). The rst element of the comparison is the same precept of situational
variability that we nd in Valerius Maximus’ chapter. At rst sight it would seem
absolutely unbelievable if people under siege paid a mina for a pint of water. However,
if you reect, necessitas makes it pardonable: ‘If people who were besieged by an enemy
were forced to buy a pint of water for a mina, at rst this would seem incredible to us
and everyone would be amazed, but when they thought about it, they would excuse it
on grounds of necessity’ (‘qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium cogerentur
mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri omnesque mirari, sed cum adtenderint, veniam
necessitati dare’, Cic., de Off. 2.56). However, this is only a passing reference, made in
the context of a discussion of extravagance, and is immediately compared to the
situation in Cicero’s own day where people likewise pay the most extraordinary prices
for things, but out of pure extravagance rather than out of necessity, and what is more,
the practice is so commonplace and widely accepted that it attracts no comment. The
example of paying a mina for a pint of water is used to show that the value of goods
changes with the context, just like the ethical value of behaviour. However, the
comparison with his contemporary situation further suggests that changing contexts
affect one’s ability to evaluate behaviour effectively.68
Valerius’ story at 7.6.3 about the selling and eating of a rat in siege conditions then
refocuses attention on the other moral aspect of ination: the behaviour of those who
take advantage of times of crisis for their own selsh gain. The exemplum combines the
idea of the disgusting lengths to which the starving but faithful besieged are driven with
another moral message: a warning for those who seek to prot from the desperation of
others. For when prices inate this is not merely a consequence of necessitas, but
requires the willingness of people to exploit the situation in order to make money from
their fellow human beings. At the end of this story, the man who sells the rat is in
possession of two hundred denarii, yet he dies because he has allowed himself to be
driven by avarice and has valued money more highly than his own life.69 There is a
strong warning here about the prioritization of two competing scales of value, and this
sets up the reader for the ethical pay-off of the chapter that comes in the nal
exemplum (7.6.ext.3) where the people of Calagurris are berated for having misguidedly
valued their own lives above those of their families.
The Roman section of the chapter, then, sets out the idea that extreme circumstances can
drive men to extraordinary deeds which are to be interpreted differently from the way one
would evaluate them under normal circumstances. Nevertheless, as in Cicero, de Ofciis
1.159, this does not imply a limitless relativism, and the nal exempla gathered in the
foreign section of the chapter make it plain that there remain limits to what is acceptable.
These foreign exempla express the idea that some acts are so degrading that not even the
most extreme circumstances can excuse them, and that defeat or death (either at one’s own
hand or someone else’s) should always be preferable. They set up situations in which
apparently universal natural laws are pitted against one another: the injunction to preserve
one’s own life and protect one’s city is in conict with the injunction not to eat human
esh. There has once again been a distinct change of context at the start of this section; in
68 Comparison of these two passages also strengthens the assimilation between the processes of making moral
decisions and reading exempla.
69 cf. Suet., Galba 7 for a similar tale of Galba’s punishment of a soldier who sells part of his ration for an
exorbitant price during a time of famine and is left to starve to death.
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each of these examples of siege situation the besieging enemy is Roman, and so, from a
Roman point of view, the potential for a morally redeeming context is severely diminished.
The acts performed by the besieged men in order to preserve their lives and not to
surrender either to death or to the enemy are disgusting. In a crescendo of grotesqueness,
the Cretans drink their own urine (7.6.ext.1), Numantines survive by eating human esh
(7.6.ext.2), and the men of Calagurris go so far as to kill and eat their own wives and
children, and preserve the esh in salt (7.6.ext.3). Even of the rst example, which seems
comparatively mild, Valerius comments that the Cretans inicted worse on themselves than
their enemy would have done had they surrendered.70 A similar comment is made of the
captured Numantines found carrying human limbs about their persons: ‘necessity is no
excuse in this case: because when people are allowed to die, there is no need to live in this
way’ (‘nulla est in his necessitatis excusatio: nam quibus mori licuit, sic vivere necesse non
fuit’, 7.6.ext.2). Of course, since in each case the enemy is Roman, defeat, even surrender,
need scarcely be thought of as shameful at all by the Roman reader, and in addition, since
history tells us that their cities were eventually captured, the barbaric act of cannibalism
was in any case in vain. The Numantines are taken alive, but stripped of all human
dignity, because they are caught in the act of shamefully prolonging life, and do not seem
to have realized that it would have been better to die.71
One of the themes we trace in this part of the chapter is the gradual shedding of
mitigating circumstances — specically, a greater cause for which the generous spirit
must pay the price to necessitas, and which can weigh on the other side when we are
assessing an act that looks at rst sight unethical. The climax of the chapter is the nal
example in which this point is driven home: the men of Calagurris survive by wilfully
destroying the very families who should have been their principal reason for wishing to
live and hold out against the siege.72 Valerius comments that these people have sunk
lower than wild animals, since even for beasts females and children are more precious
than life. Moreover the act of eating their own families sweeps away from under their
feet the conventional motivation of a soldier risking his life on the battleeld. Valerius
exclaims sarcastically: ‘This would inspire someone on the battleeld to ght bravely for
the safety of wives and children!’ (‘en quam aliquis in acie hortaretur ut pro salute
coniugum et liberorum fortiter dimicaret!’, 7.6.ext.3). The behaviour of the people in the
foreign examples defeats its own purpose, since they have lost sight of what is truly
valuable in life. The men of Calagurris have prioritized the injunction to preserve their
own lives and protect their city over the injunction to protect their wives and children.
In any case, for non-Romans the patriotic injunction is a weaker rule than it would have
been for a city of Romans, since the principle of situational variability operates with
respect to national difference, and, in addition, both hindsight and the cultural
superiority of the Romans render their patriotism futile and misguided.
Valerius’ chapter engages with the ongoing Stoic debates about whether circumstances
might justify acts such as suicide and cannibalism that are strongly prohibited under
normal circumstances.73 Valerius’ exempla bring into play the same motifs and ethical
conicts in his consideration of the implications of situation ethics. However, by the end
70 ‘id passi sunt quod eos ne victor quidem pati coegisset.’ Note the implication that the enemy is honourable.
Drinking urine perhaps might be counted as a form of self-mutilation of the kind usually not to be
contemplated in Stoic doctrine.
71 This is a well-known example, told by Appian in The Wars in Spain 96–7. The Numantines are described as
doing this terrible thing and then surrendering to Scipio with an expression of fear and misery on account of their
consciousness of having eaten human esh. See Florus 1.34 for a slightly different account in which they live for a
while off corpses.
72 Another mention of this story, which clearly aroused Roman interest, is found at Juv., Sat. 15.93–109; cf.
Orosius 5.23.14.
73 Inwood, op. cit. (n. 1), 113.
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of the chapter the moral message conveyed by his treatment of them is somewhat different
from the Stoic idea that even the strongest prohibitions may on occasion be circumvented.
Valerius’ message seems to be in dialogue with this Stoic doctrine of exceptional
circumstances, and to send a warning that, whilst allowing for situational variability, it is
vitally important to adhere to certain core principles of humanity (such as protecting one’s
children), and that where principles are in conict with one another, one must think very
carefully about which should take priority or else risk going badly astray. Valerius uses
the shocking stories of extreme behaviour which so intrigued the Romans in other
contexts too74 to explore the implications and limitations of situation ethics.
V CONCLUSION
I have argued that Valerius outlines ideas on situational variability as part of a
meta-exemplary message about how to read exempla in a way that is sensitive to
context, yet at the same time does not lose sight of key moral precepts. Analysis of
Valerius’ work allows us to appreciate that exempla need not be the instruments of a
prescriptive, top-down moral system, providing enactments of virtue or vice to be simply
imitated or avoided.75 In the rst place, Valerius uses them to explore broader ethical
issues, including those relating to the ethical function of exempla. Moreover, even when
they are viewed as enactments of virtue, exempla are to be understood, within a
framework of situation ethics, not as prescriptive templates of behaviour, but as specic
instances of virtuous action that have been brought about in response to the interaction
between a web of contingent factors, including the various personae and rôles of the
individual performing the deed, and factors such as place and time.
A reader and user of exempla must be clear, as Valerius emphasizes, that a moral choice
or act which is appropriate for one particular person in one particular context may well not
be the same one that is appropriate for another person in another context. Therefore one’s
assessment of an exemplum and one’s decision about to what extent or in what aspects it is
applicable to one’s own life must be carried out with full awareness of a whole range of
contingent factors. A reader must measure himself or herself against each exemplum:
would he or she be capable of, and suited to, performing that deed in those
circumstances? In addition, rather than necessarily representing the only right way for
anyone to act in those or similar circumstances, an exemplum is one possible enactment
of a good moral decision, given those circumstances. For the reader, it provides an
opportunity to observe and assess the moral decision-making of an exemplary gure, as
a means of learning about that process of decision-making.
Valerius Maximus’ exempla convey messages about how to apply abstract virtues to
particular cases. Understood within the framework of situation ethics articulated by both
Cicero and Valerius Maximus, exempla can be seen as constituting a moral tool that goes
some way towards providing a practical solution to the ethical problem of how to
reconcile universal executive virtues with the need for situational sensitivity. By enacting
the process of moral decision-making again and again in various different ways and
different circumstances, a multiplicity of exempla — whether gathered in a collection such
as the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, or encountered over the course of a Roman life-time —
teach a moral agent how to go about applying abstract virtues to their own specic cases.
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75 On this see further Langlands, op. cit. (n. 8).
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